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AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTH  
CAROLINA v. TATA: MANIPULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT 
SPEECH DOCTRINE THROUGH SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATES 
KAITLIN E. LEARY∗ 
In American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of North Carolina v. Ta-
ta,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered 
whether specialty license plates bearing the message, “Choose Life,” which 
were authorized by the North Carolina General Assembly, constituted pri-
vate or government speech.2  The Fourth Circuit employed a four-factor test 
developed in an earlier case also concerning specialty license plates and in-
formed by two later United States Supreme Court decisions on the govern-
ment speech doctrine outside of the specialty license plate context.3  Using 
this analysis, the Fourth Circuit found that the Choose Life license plate 
implicated private speech interests.4  Therefore, North Carolina engaged in 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amend-
ment by authorizing the Choose Life plate while rejecting a pro-choice spe-
cialty license plate.5 
The Fourth Circuit in Tata correctly concluded that North Carolina at-
tempted to manipulate the government speech doctrine to prevent the ex-
pression of a disfavored viewpoint by claiming private speech as its own.6  
However, the court incorrectly interpreted Supreme Court case law on the 
government speech doctrine, which resulted in it employing an improper 
analysis to address the government speech issue.7  Instead, the Fourth Cir-
cuit should have simplified and reduced its four-factor balancing test into a 
dispositive two-element test: the actual and apparent accountability test.8  
Under this test, the contested speech is government speech if (1) the gov-
                                                          
© 2015 Kaitlin E. Leary. 
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  The au-
thor wishes to thank her editors, Betsy Johnson and Alyssa Domzal, as well as Professor Richard 
Boldt, for their feedback and guidance throughout the writing process.  She also wishes to thank 
her parents, Kathleen and Robert Leary, for their support throughout her academic career, and 
Greg Samonds, whose unwavering patience and encouragement made this Note possible. 
 1.  742 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 2.  Id. at 567. 
 3.  See infra Part III. 
 4.  See infra Part III. 
 5.  See infra Part III. 
 6.  See infra Part III. 
 7.  See infra Part IV. 
 8.  See infra Part IV. 
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ernment controls the content and dissemination of the message, and (2) the 
government appears, to a reasonable and fully informed observer, to be the 
literal speaker of the message.9  The existence of these two elements en-
sures that the government can be held accountable for its speech through the 
political process and prevents the government from improperly relying on 
the government speech doctrine to suppress disfavored viewpoints in a 
speech forum.10  Therefore, if either element of the actual and apparent ac-
countability test is lacking, the contested speech is that of a private party 
and traditional First Amendment protections apply.11 
I.  THE CASE 
In June 2011, the North Carolina General Assembly passed, and North 
Carolina Governor Beverly Perdue signed into law, House Bill 289.12  The 
bill authorized approximately 70 new specialty license plates and brought 
the total number of authorized specialty plates in North Carolina to approx-
imately 150.13  Included among the newly authorized plates was one bear-
ing the message, “Choose Life” (“Choose Life plate”).14  By the terms of 
the statute, the Choose Life plate would cost an individual $25 annually (in 
addition to yearly state registration fees), $15 of which would go to the 
Carolina Pregnancy Care Fellowship, a private organization that provides 
support for crisis pregnancy centers throughout North Carolina.15  The stat-
ute authorizing the Choose Life plate expressly prohibits these funds “from 
‘be[ing] distributed to any agency, organization, business, or other entity 
that provides, promotes, counsels, or refers to abortion.’”16  The Division of 
Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) would be able to develop the plate once it re-
ceived 300 applications for the Choose Life plate17 through the Carolina 
                                                          
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 11.  See infra Part IV. 
 12.  ACLU of N.C. v. Conti (Conti I), 835 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (citing Act 
effective June 30, 2011, Sess. Law 2011-392, 2011 N.C. Sess. Law 1594). 
 13.  ACLU of N.C. v. Conti (Conti II), 912 F. Supp. 2d 363, 371 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (citing 
Sess. Law 2011-392 § (b)(1)), 2011 N.C. Sess. Law 1594), aff’d subnom. ACLU of N.C. v. Tata, 
742 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 14.  Conti I, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (citing Sess. Law 2011-392 § 1(b1)(39), 2011 N.C. Sess. 
Laws at 1595) . 
 15.  Id. at 54–55 (citing Sess. Law 2011-392 §§ 4(a), 5, 7(b84), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 
1604–05, 1607, 1613). 
 16.  Id. at 55 (alteration in original) (quoting Sess. Law 2011-392 § 7(b84), 2011 N.C. Sess. 
Laws at 1613). 
 17.  Id. (citing N.C. Sess. Law 2011–392 § 7(b84)). 
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Pregnancy Care Fellowship.18  Once the DMV issued the plate, it could be 
purchased by any vehicle owner in North Carolina.19 
Only those specialty plates that have been specifically authorized by 
the General Assembly are available to North Carolina vehicle owners.20  
Unlike many other states, there is no general statute or administrative 
scheme through which individuals and organizations can request and obtain 
specialty license plates.21  Thus, during the 2011 Legislative Session, vari-
ous legislators made six attempts to amend House Bill 289 to include an-
other specialty plate with one of the following messages: “Respect Choice” 
or “Trust Women. Respect Choice.”22  All of those attempts were rejected 
by the General Assembly.23 
Thereafter, the ACLU of North Carolina, along with registered North 
Carolina vehicle owners who wished to purchase a specialty license plate 
displaying a message supporting reproductive choice (collectively, “Plain-
tiffs”), filed suit against the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of 
Transportation and the Commissioner of the North Carolina DMV (collec-
tively, “the State” or “North Carolina”).24  The Plaintiffs sought a prelimi-
nary injunction to prohibit the issuance of the Choose Life plates.25  They 
alleged that, by authorizing the Choose Life plate while rejecting a pro-
choice plate, the State had impermissibly discriminated on the basis of 
viewpoint in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.26 
In December 2011, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of North Carolina granted the preliminary injunction.27  The district 
court utilized the four-factor test adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Commissioner of Virginia Department of Mo-
tor Vehicles (“SCV”)28 and relied on the factually similar case of Planned 
                                                          
 18.  Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 365–66.  The Carolina Pregnancy Care Fellowship received 
the requisite 300 applications by September 22, 2011.  Id. at 366. 
 19.  Conti I, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 55. 
 20.  Id. at 54. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 55. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 54–55.  While the case was pending in district court, Eugene Conti held the position 
of Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Transportation and Michael Robertson held the 
position of Commissioner of the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles.  Id. at 54. 
 25.  Id. at 54–55. 
 26.  Id. at 56. 
 27.  Id. at 63. 
 28.  288 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2002).  In SCV, the Fourth Circuit considered whether a proposed 
specialty license plate for the Sons of Confederate Veterans organization constituted private or 
government speech.  Id. at 616.  Noting that neither the Fourth Circuit nor the Supreme Court had 
established a definitive test for answering this question, the court adopted a four-factor test that 
had been utilized by other circuits in government speech cases outside of the specialty license 
plate context.  Id. at 618.  The four “instructive” factors are “(1) the central ‘purpose’ of the pro-
gram in which the speech in question occurs; (2) the degree of ‘editorial control’ exercised by the 
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Parenthood of South Carolina, Inc. v. Rose29 in its decision.30  The court 
preliminarily concluded that the Choose Life plate did not constitute pure 
government speech,31 and therefore had to comply with the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment.32  The court rejected the State’s argument 
that the Supreme Court had announced a new test for identifying govern-
ment speech in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n33 and that SCV and 
Rose were no longer good law.34  Instead, the district court found that the 
Fourth Circuit had continued to utilize the SCV factors in opinions postdat-
ing Johanns and that Johanns was not “wholly applicable in the specialty 
license plate context” because Johanns is a compelled subsidy case.35  The 
district court preliminarily agreed with the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the State 
had engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the 
First Amendment, and thus found that the Plaintiffs had met their burden of 
establishing a likelihood of success on the merits.36 
                                                          
government or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the ‘literal speak-
er’; and (4) whether the government or the private entity bears the ‘ultimate responsibility’ for the 
content of the speech.”  Id.; see infra Part II.B.3. 
 29.  361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).  In Rose, the Fourth Circuit held that the Choose Life plate 
authorized by the South Carolina legislature constituted a mixture of private and government 
speech and, therefore, the State violated the First Amendment by refusing to authorize a corre-
sponding pro-choice plate.  Id. at 794, 799; see infra Part II.B.4. 
 30.  Conti I, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 61. 
 31.  The Fourth Circuit has recognized that the classification of speech as either “govern-
ment” or “private” is an oversimplification, as some speech may have both government and pri-
vate characteristics.  W. Va. Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 
292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Rose, 361 F.3d at 794 (“I conclude that SCV’s four-factor test 
indicates that both the State and the individual vehicle owner are speaking.  . . . Therefore, the 
speech here appears to be neither purely government speech nor purely private speech, but a mix-
ture of the two.”); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 
305 F.3d 241, 244–45 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) 
(“[M]y colleagues have struggled with this case because they have assumed, in oversimplification, 
that all speech must be either that of a private individual or that of the government, and that a 
speech event cannot be both private and governmental at the same time.”).  Other circuits that 
have addressed the issue of government speech, as well as the Supreme Court, have yet to recog-
nize the possibility of such “mixed” or “hybrid” speech.  However, the Fourth Circuit has deter-
mined that “mixed” or “hybrid” speech is treated essentially the same as private speech for First 
Amendment purposes.  See Rose, 361 F.3d at 799 (“South Carolina has engaged in viewpoint dis-
crimination by allowing only the Choose Life plate . . . .  This is prohibited by the First Amend-
ment.”).  Since mixed speech is subject to the same constitutional protections as private speech, 
this Note will not distinguish between the two.  Thus, any speech that is referred to as “private,” 
“mixed,” “hybrid,” or “not purely government” speech will be treated as constitutionally equiva-
lent, as distinguished from “pure government” or “government” speech. 
 32.  Conti I, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 61. 
 33.  544 U.S. 550 (2005).  In Johanns, the Supreme Court found that the federal government 
established the message of a national beef promotion campaign and effectively controlled the con-
tent and dissemination of that message.  Id. at 560.  Thus, the Court held that the beef campaign 
constituted government speech.  Id. at 562; see infra Part II.C.1. 
 34.  Conti I, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 58, 61. 
 35.  Id. at 59. 
 36.  Id. at 61. 
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In December 2012, the district court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment and permanently enjoined North Carolina from issuing 
the Choose Life plate.37  The State again argued that Johanns replaced the 
four SCV factors with a single-factor test—the control test—for determining 
what constitutes government speech, and further asserted “that the Supreme 
Court confirmed the use of this test in its decision in” a subsequent case.38  
The district court again rejected this argument, and interpreted Johanns and 
Summum “as evaluating factors the Supreme Court deemed relevant to the 
particular facts at issue in those cases,” rather than announcing a new test.39 
Additionally, North Carolina argued that SCV and Rose were no longer 
good law because the Fourth Circuit, in Page v. Lexington County School 
District One,40 applied the two factors articulated in Johanns instead of the 
four SCV factors to determine whether the contested speech was that of the 
government.41  Because the Fourth Circuit returned to application of the 
four SCV factors in subsequent cases,42 the State argued that either these 
cases were inconsistent, or the Fourth Circuit uses the SCV factors differ-
ently in different contexts.43  In either instance, the State argued, Page 
would control the outcome of the instant case.44  The district court rejected 
this argument as well, finding that there was no “irreconcilable conflict” be-
tween Page and the later cases, and that Page was not so factually similar to 
the instant case so as to “dictate [that] this court apply the only two factors 
used by the Page court.”45 
                                                          
 37.  Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d 363, 375 (E.D.N.C. 2012), aff’d subnom. ACLU of N.C. v. Ta-
ta, 742 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 38.  Id. at 368.  North Carolina cited Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, which held that 
privately donated monuments displayed in a city-owned park qualified as government speech, in 
part because the city exercised “‘final approval authority’ over their selection.”  555 U.S. 460, 473 
(2009) (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–561); see infra Part II.D.1. 
 39.  Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 372. 
 40.  531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 41.  Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 373.  In Page, the Fourth Circuit found that, in cases con-
cerning the government’s use of third-party messages, Johanns “distilled” the SCV factors into 
two inquiries: “(1) the government’s establishment of the message, and (2) its effective control 
over the content and dissemination of the message.”  531 F.3d at 281 (citing Johanns, 544 U.S. at 
560–62); see infra Part II.C.4. 
 42.  The State cited Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Virginia, 534 F.3d 352 (4th 
Cir. 2008), and Musgrave as cases in which the Fourth Circuit returned to application of the SCV 
four-factor test after Page.  Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 373; see infra Part II.C.4 (discussing these 
cases). 
 43.  Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 373. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id.  In Page, the school district expressed its opposition to pending voucher legislation 
through its website and through e-mails and letters to parents and school employees.  531 F.3d at 
278–79.  A county resident sued the school district after it refused to allow him to express his sup-
port for the pending legislation using the district’s website and other communication channels.  Id. 
at 279; see infra Part II.C.4. 
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After applying the SCV factors, the district court concluded that the 
Choose Life plates were not pure government speech, but instead were “a 
government-sponsored avenue to encourage private speech.”46  The court 
held that offering the Choose Life plate while rejecting a pro-choice plate 
constituted viewpoint discrimination by the State in violation of the First 
Amendment.47  North Carolina appealed the district court’s decision to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.48 
II  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”49  This 
guarantee creates a presumption of unconstitutionality when the govern-
ment regulates or restricts individual expression based on content.50  Unless 
the restricted speech falls within one of the established exceptions to free-
dom of speech, the restriction will be struck down as violative of the First 
Amendment.51 
The Free Speech Clause also limits the government’s ability to regu-
late speech that occurs on government property.  Such regulations are re-
viewed according to the property’s classification as a traditional public fo-
rum, designated public forum, or limited public forum.52  In a traditional 
public forum or a designated public forum, government restrictions on pri-
vate speech must satisfy strict scrutiny review, meaning “the restriction 
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”53  In 
such fora, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible, 
but restrictions based on viewpoint are prohibited.54  In a limited public fo-
rum, the government may restrict private speech by subject matter, or limit 
                                                          
 46.  Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 375. 
 47.  Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 799 (4th Cir. 2004); 
Rose, 361 F.3d at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring in the judgment); Rose, 361 F.3d at 801 (Gregory, J., 
concurring in the judgment)). 
 48.  ACLU of N.C. v. Tata, 742 F.3d 563, 567 (4th Cir. 2014.) 
 49.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 50.  See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (“[M]ost situations where the State has a 
justifiable interest in regulating speech will fall within one or more of the various established ex-
ceptions . . . to the usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or content of 
individual expression.”). 
 51.  Id.  Examples of established exceptions to the prohibition of government regulation on 
speech include obscenity, “fighting words,” and “true threats.” Id. at 20 (discussing obscenity and 
fighting words); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (discussing true threats). 
 52.  See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2009) (noting the var-
ious standards of review and permissible restrictions on speech for each type of forum). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 469. 
  
116 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 74:110 
its use to certain groups.55  However, such restrictions must be reasonable 
and viewpoint neutral.56 
A.  The Supreme Court Implicitly Employed a Government Speech 
Analysis for the First Time in Rust, Then Developed the Doctrine in 
Subsequent Cases Interpreting Rust 
The government speech doctrine stands for the proposition that when 
the government speaks for itself, “it is entitled to say what it wishes.”57  
Thus, before a court can evaluate the constitutionality of a regulation or re-
striction on speech, it first must determine which entity is speaking—the 
government or a private party.  This doctrine has its origins in Rust v. Sulli-
van,58 where the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to 
federal funds conditioned upon certain restrictions on speech.59  Although 
the Rust Court never used the term “government speech,” subsequent First 
Amendment cases cited Rust as an example of the government speaking for 
itself to contrast cases in which the government funded private speech, thus 
establishing the government speech doctrine.60 
1.  Rust Established That Traditional First Amendment Analysis 
Does Not Apply When the Government Promotes Its Own 
Message 
Rust concerned Title X of the Public Health Service Act,61 which pro-
vides federal funding for family-planning services.62  The Act expressly 
forbids any funds appropriated under Title X being “‘used in programs 
where abortion is a method of family planning,’” and provides that all 
grants and contracts made under Title X must be in accordance with regula-
tions promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secre-
tary”).63  “In 1988, the Secretary promulgated new regulations designed to 
provide . . . ‘guidance to [Title X] grantees about how to preserve the dis-
tinction between Title X programs and abortion as a method of family plan-
ning.’”64  The regulations attached three conditions on the grant of federal 
funds for Title X projects: (1) the prohibition of counseling or referrals for 
                                                          
 55.  Id. at 470. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). 
 58.  500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 59.  See id. at 192 (“There is no question but that the statutory prohibition [on speech] con-
tained in § 1008 is constitutional.”). 
 60.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-6 (2012). 
 62.  500 U.S. at 178.   
 63.  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-4(a), 300a-6). 
 64.  Id. at 179 (quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 2923–24 (1988)). 
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abortions; (2) the prohibition of encouraging, promoting, or advocating 
abortion; and (3) a requirement that the projects be “physically and finan-
cially separate” from abortion activities.65 
Title X grantees and doctors who supervised the funds (“Petitioners”) 
sued the Secretary on behalf of themselves and their patients, claiming that 
the regulations were facially invalid, in part because they violated the First 
Amendment rights of Title X clients and health providers.66  Petitioners 
claimed that the regulations impermissibly discriminated based on view-
point by compelling clinics to promote continuing a pregnancy to term 
while prohibiting any discussion of abortion as an option.67  The Court re-
jected Petitioners’ First Amendment argument and found that, rather than 
discriminating based on viewpoint, the government had “merely chosen to 
fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”68  The Court found this 
permissible because “[t]he government can, without violating the Constitu-
tion, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to 
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative 
program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.”69  Thus, the 
Government can “make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, 
and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.”70 
2.  Subsequent First Amendment Cases Cited Rust as an Example 
of the Government Speaking on Its Own Behalf 
Although the Rust Court never used the term “government speech,” 
subsequent cases involving First Amendment challenges interpreted Rust as 
establishing a distinct analysis when the government promotes its own mes-
sage, as opposed to funding private speech.71  First, in Rosenberger, the 
Court cited Rust as it distinguished the government’s use of private speak-
ers to convey its own message (such as in Rust) from government programs 
that encourage private speech (such as in Rosenberger).72  The Court found 
that “[w]hen the government disburses public funds to private entities to 
convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate 
                                                          
 65.  Id. at 179–80 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8–.10 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66.  Id. at 181. 
 67.  Id. at 192 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 11, Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (No. 89-1391)). 
 68.  Id. at 193. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 192–93 (alteration in original) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71.  See SCV, 288 F.3d 610, 617 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[N]owhere in Rust did the Court rely ex-
plicitly on the government speech rationale.  . . . In later cases, however, the Court consistently 
has interpreted Rust as indicating that the doctors’ funded counseling activities were government 
speech, and that where the government is the speaker, it may choose and tailor its message.” 
(footnote omitted) (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001))). 
 72.  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). 
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steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grant-
ee.”73  However, the Court held that the same logic does not apply “when 
the [government] does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message 
it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from 
private speakers.”74  In the latter instance, the government creates a public 
forum and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are impermissible.75 
The Court next cited Rust as an example of the government speaking 
for itself in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. 
Southworth.76  In this case, the Court noted that the First Amendment anal-
ysis it employed does not apply when the government speaks on its own 
behalf.77  The Southworth Court also explained the rationale behind the 
government speech doctrine, clarifying why traditional First Amendment 
principles are inapplicable to instances where the government speaks for it-
self: “When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own poli-
cies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the elec-
torate and the political process for its advocacy.  If the citizenry objects, 
newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary posi-
tion.”78 
Finally, in Velazquez, the Court cited Rust as the origin of the govern-
ment speech doctrine and noted its interpretation as such in Rosenberger 
and Southworth.79  The Court then explained that the government may dis-
criminate based on viewpoint when “the government is itself the speaker” 
or when the government funds private speakers to transmit a governmental 
message.80 
This line of cases establishes that traditional First Amendment princi-
ples, including the prohibition on viewpoint-based discrimination on 
speech, do not apply to government speech.81  However, these preliminary 
government speech cases failed to provide a rule for determining what con-
                                                          
 73.  Id. (emphasis added) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196–200). 
 74.  Id. at 834. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
 77.  Id. at 234–35 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. 173; Regan v. Taxation With Representation of 
Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983)). 
 78.  Id. at 235. 
 79.  See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did 
not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title 
X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we 
have explained Rust on this understanding.”). 
 80.  Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833) (citing Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229, 235). 
 81.  See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (“The Free Speech 
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government 
speech.”). 
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stitutes government speech and left the lower courts with little guidance on 
how to analyze this issue.82 
B.  Specialty License Plates Contain Elements of both Government and 
Private Speech 
The Supreme Court first addressed the private speech rights implicated 
by license plates in Wooley v. Maynard.83  Although Wooley dealt with the 
private speech interests of standard-issue license plates, lower courts have 
since relied on Wooley to support their findings that specialty license plates 
also implicate private speech interests.84  The Fourth Circuit was the first 
circuit court to address the First Amendment implications of specialty li-
cense plates in SCV, where it adopted a four-factor test to determine wheth-
er specialty license plates constitute government speech.85 
1.  Wooley Laid the Foundation for Specialty License Plate 
Jurisprudence 
At issue in Wooley was a New Hampshire state law that required non-
commercial vehicles to display license plates with the state motto, “Live 
Free or Die,” and another state law that made it a misdemeanor to obscure 
the motto.86  George Maynard and his wife covered the motto on their fami-
ly vehicles, finding it repugnant to their moral, religious, and political be-
liefs.87  Maynard was convicted in state court of violating the misdemeanor 
statute and sentenced to pay two fines of twenty-five and fifty dollars, re-
spectively.88  The Maynards then brought suit in federal district court under 
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against New Hampshire officials, seeking injunc-
tive and declaratory relief against enforcement of the state statutes.89 
The Supreme Court found that “the right of freedom of thought pro-
tected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to 
                                                          
 82.  See SCV, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002) (“No clear standard has yet been enunciated 
in our circuit or by the Supreme Court for determining when the government is ‘speaking’ and 
thus able to draw viewpoint-based distinctions, and when it is regulating private speech and thus 
unable to do so.”). 
 83.  430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 84.  See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting the 
Supreme Court’s indication “that messages conveyed through license plates ‘implicate private 
speech interests’” (quoting SCV, 288 F.3d at 621) (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717)); Planned 
Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
held that even messages on standard license plates are associated at least partly with the vehicle 
owners.” (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717)). 
 85.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 86.  430 U.S. at 707 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:1 (Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 262:27-c (Supp. 1975)). 
 87.  Id. at 707–08. 
 88.  Id. at 708.  Upon refusing to pay the fines, Maynard served fifteen days in jail.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 709. 
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speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”90  Thus, the Court 
held that the Maynards’ interests implicated First Amendment protections 
because the New Hampshire statutes forced them to use their vehicles as 
“an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of 
view [they found] unacceptable.”91  Furthermore, the Court found that the 
State’s interests of proper identification of passenger vehicles and promot-
ing appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride were not suffi-
ciently compelling to justify requiring the Maynards to display the state 
motto on their license plates.92  Therefore, the Court held that New Hamp-
shire could not require the Maynards to display the state motto on their per-
sonal vehicles.93 
2.  Specialty License Plates Allow Individuals to Display a 
Particular Message or Image for an Additional Fee 
Although Wooley dealt with the private speech interests of standard-
issue license plates, lower courts have since cited Wooley for the proposi-
tion that messages on license plates are associated with the private vehicle 
owner’s expression, and that association is only stronger in the case of spe-
cialty license plates.94  Specialty license plates are produced by the gov-
ernment, usually at the request of a private individual or organization, to 
display a particular message or image.95  Registered vehicle owners can ob-
tain a specialty license plate by paying additional fees beyond those re-
quired for registration.96 
The process of creating specialty license plates varies from state to 
state, but there are three models into which the methods of most states can 
be classified: the administrative model, the legislative model, and the hy-
brid model.97  Under the administrative model, the state has a general spe-
cialty license plate statute that establishes the procedure by which organiza-
                                                          
 90.  Id. at 714. 
 91.  Id. at 715. 
 92.  Id. at 716–17. 
 93.  Id. at 717. 
 94.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has held that even messages on standard license plates are associated at 
least partly with the vehicle owners.  This association is much stronger when the vehicle owner 
displays a specialty license plate.” (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717; SCV, 288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th 
Cir. 2002))). 
 95.  See id. (“Although a specialty license plate, like a standard plate, is state-owned and 
bears a state-authorized message, the specialty plate gives private individuals the option to identi-
fy with, purchase, and display one of the authorized messages.”). 
 96.  See Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In specialty li-
cense plate cases, private individuals choose to pay the price for obtaining a particular specialty 
license plate.”). 
 97.  Stephanie S. Bell, Note, The First Amendment and Specialty License Plates: The 
“Choose Life” Controversy, 73 MO. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (2008). 
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tions can request specialty plates and designates a state agency (such as the 
DMV) to review and process those requests.98  Under the legislative model, 
state legislatures enact statutes that directly authorize the issuance of partic-
ular specialty plates, and describe the method by which each plate will be 
produced.99  Finally, under the hybrid model, state legislatures can author-
ize the issuance of particular specialty plates by statute (as in the legislative 
model), or organizations can apply for a specialty plate through a designat-
ed state agency (as in the administrative model).100 
3.  The Fourth Circuit Adopted a Four-Factor Test to Determine 
Whether Specialty License Plates Constitute Government 
Speech 
The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit court to address the First 
Amendment implications of specialty license plates.  In SCV, the Virginia 
General Assembly enacted a statute authorizing the issuance of specialty 
license plates to members of the Sons of Confederate Veterans organization 
(“SCV”).101  However, unlike other Virginia statutes authorizing specialty 
plates for members of various organizations, this statute included a logo re-
striction that prohibited SCV from incorporating its logo, which features the 
Confederate flag, on its plates.102  SCV sued the Commissioner of the Vir-
ginia DMV, seeking a declaration that the logo restriction was invalid under 
the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and an injunction requiring the 
Commissioner to issue SCV’s specialty license plates, logo included, to 
members who request them.103 
The Fourth Circuit began by explaining the Supreme Court’s govern-
ment speech jurisprudence104 and noted that the authority of the government 
to speak on its own behalf “necessarily carries with it the authority to select 
from among various viewpoints those that the government will express as 
its own.”105  The court also commented on the Supreme Court’s explanation 
in Southworth of the rationale behind the government speech doctrine, not-
ing that “where the government itself is responsible, and therefore account-
able, for the message that its speech sends, the danger ordinarily involved in 
governmental viewpoint-based choices is not present.”106 
                                                          
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 1282. 
 100.  Id. at 1283. 
 101.  288 F.3d 610, 613 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 614. 
 104.  See supra Part II.A. 
 105.  SCV, 288 F.3d at 617. 
 106.  Id. at 618; see supra text accompanying notes 76–78. 
  
122 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 74:110 
Next, the Fourth Circuit noted that neither it nor the Supreme Court 
had enunciated a “clear standard” for distinguishing government speech 
from private speech.107  Thus, the court identified four factors examined by 
other circuits who had addressed the question in other contexts:  
(1) the central “purpose” of the program in which the speech in 
question occurs; (2) the degree of “editorial control” exercised by 
the government or private entities over the content of the speech; 
(3) the identity of the “literal speaker”; and (4) whether the gov-
ernment or the private entity bears the “ultimate responsibility” 
for the content of the speech.108   
The court noted that these factors do not “constitute an exhaustive or al-
ways-applicable list,” but found them “instructive” and sufficient to resolve 
the issue in this case.109 
Applying these factors to SCV’s specialty license plate, the court 
found, first, that the purpose of Virginia’s specialty license plate program 
was primarily to produce revenue for the Commonwealth, while also allow-
ing for the private expression of a variety of messages.110  Therefore, the 
first factor weighed against a finding of government speech.111  Second, the 
court concluded that Virginia exercised “little, if any, control” over the con-
tent of its specialty plates, finding instead that the sponsors of the specialty 
plates “make the substantive decisions regarding . . . content.”112  Third, the 
court found that the literal speaker and ultimate responsibility factors also 
weighed in favor of private speech because the plates, although owned by 
Virginia, are mounted on vehicles owned by private persons.113  Citing 
Wooley, the court found that “license plates, even when owned by the gov-
ernment, implicate private speech interests because of the connection of any 
message on the plate to the driver or owner of the vehicle.”114  Therefore, 
the court concluded that the specialty license plate authorized by the statute 
                                                          
 107.  SCV, 288 F.3d at 618. 
 108.  Id. (citing Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (using 
the four factors to determine whether a sign naming the private sponsors of a public holiday dis-
play constituted government speech); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of 
Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000) (using the four factors to determine whether messages from 
private sponsors on a public radio station constituted government speech); Downs v. L.A. Unified 
Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying similar analysis to determine whether 
postings on school bulletin boards constitute government speech)). 
 109.  Id. at 619. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See id. (“[T]he net financial impact of the program on the Commonwealth’s fisc does 
indicate that the General Assembly here is not making the kind of selective funding decisions in-
volved in cases like Rust . . . .”). 
 112.  Id. at 621. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977)). 
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was SCV’s speech, not Virginia’s, and thus First Amendment protections 
applied.115 
4.  The Fourth Circuit Applied Its Four-Factor Test to an Earlier 
Challenge to Choose Life License Plates 
The Fourth Circuit subsequently applied the SCV four-factor test for 
distinguishing government speech to specialty license plates in Rose.  The 
facts of Rose closely resemble those of Conti: The South Carolina legisla-
ture enacted a statute (“South Carolina Act”) that authorized the issuance of 
a Choose Life plate that would be available to any interested vehicle owner 
in South Carolina.116  Planned Parenthood of South Carolina (“PPSC”) at-
tempted to amend earlier versions of the South Carolina Act to include a 
provision for the issuance of a pro-choice plate, but those bills died in 
committee.117 
PPSC sued South Carolina officials seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief, alleging that the South Carolina Act violated the First Amendment by 
regulating access to the specialty license plate forum on the basis of view-
point.118  The Fourth Circuit found that the district court incorrectly inter-
preted SCV—by overlooking important factual differences between the two 
cases—as holding that specialty license plates necessarily constitute private 
rather than government speech.119  In SCV, the Fourth Circuit noted, “Vir-
ginia acted as regulator of the existing specialty license plate forum”; in 
comparison, in this case South Carolina was acting “as a covert speaker” 
within that forum.120 
Proper application of the SCV four-factor test led the court to conclude 
that the Choose Life plate contained elements of both private and govern-
ment speech.121  First, the court found that the purpose of the South Caroli-
na Act was “to promote [South Carolina’s] preference for the pro-life posi-
tion,” and thus this factor weighed in favor of finding government 
                                                          
 115.  Id. at 621–22.  The court went on to find that Virginia’s logo restriction was impermissi-
ble viewpoint discrimination, as the Commissioner failed to demonstrate that the restriction was 
the least restrictive means available to serve a compelling government interest.  Id. at 626.  
 116.  Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 788 (4th Cir. 2004).  According 
to the court, the South Carolina Act “came about because of the perseverance of two legislators 
who were acting on their own initiative”; it was not initiated by any pro-life organization.  Id. at 
789. 
 117.  Id. at 788.  South Carolina, operating under the hybrid model of specialty-license-plate 
creation, also has a general statute that authorizes the issuance of specialty license plates for non-
profit organizations.  Id.  However, organizational plates are only available to certified members 
of the organization and may only contain the organization’s emblem.  Id. (quoting S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 56-3-8000(A), (H) (2001)).  PPSC did not apply for an organizational plate.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 789. 
 119.  Id. at 793. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 794. 
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speech.122  Second, the court found that South Carolina “exercises complete 
editorial control over the content of the speech on the Choose Life plate,” 
and thus this factor also weighed in favor of finding government speech.123  
Third, to determine the identity of the literal speaker and who bears the ul-
timate responsibility for the speech, the court, citing Wooley, “found that 
even messages on standard license plates are associated at least partly with 
the vehicle owners.  This association is much stronger when the vehicle 
owner displays a specialty license plate.”124  Furthermore, the court found 
that those who viewed the Choose Life plate would assume that the vehicle 
owner “holds a pro-life viewpoint.”125  Therefore, the court concluded that 
the vehicle owner was the literal speaker of, and bore the ultimate responsi-
bility for, the Choose Life plate, and thus these two factors weighed in favor 
of finding private speech.126 
Since the four factors led to an “indeterminate result,” with two factors 
weighing in favor of government speech and two weighing in favor of pri-
vate speech, the court concluded that the Choose Life plate was mixed 
speech,127 and thus the government speech doctrine did not apply.128  There-
fore, the South Carolina Act, by authorizing the Choose Life plate while re-
jecting a pro-choice plate, constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimina-
tion in violation of the First Amendment and thus was invalid.129 
C.  The Supreme Court Used a Different Analysis for Government 
Speech in Johanns, Producing Disagreement Among the Circuits 
over the Proper Test 
After the Fourth Circuit had developed the SCV four-factor test for 
evaluating government speech, the Supreme Court addressed the issue us-
ing a different analysis in Johanns.130  The Johanns decision produced dis-
agreement among the circuits over the proper test for determining govern-
ment speech.131 
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 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 794 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977); SCV, 288 F.3d 610, 621 
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1.  The Supreme Court Evaluated the Government’s Establishment 
and Control of the Contested Speech in Johanns 
In Johanns, beef producers objected to the Department of Agricul-
ture’s requirement that they fund a beef promotion campaign because it un-
dermined their efforts to promote their own specialty beef products, such as 
American beef, grain-fed beef, and certified Angus beef.132  In determining 
that the beef ads at issue constituted government speech, the Court focused 
on the government’s establishment and control of the content of the mes-
sage, without explicitly stating that this was the test for government 
speech.133 
Regarding establishment, the Court noted that “[t]he message set out 
in the beef promotions is from beginning to end the message established by 
the Federal Government,” and that the government had “set out the over-
arching message and some of its elements.”134  Regarding control, the Court 
found that the federal government “effectively controlled” the message of 
the beef promotions and “the Secretary exercise[d] final approval authority 
over every word used in every promotional campaign.”135  Thus, the Court 
concluded that “[w]hen, as here, the government sets the overall message to 
be communicated and approves every word that is disseminated,” the gov-
ernment speech doctrine applies.136 
2.  The Sixth Circuit Applied Johanns to the Specialty License Plate 
Context 
The Sixth Circuit, in ACLU of Tennessee v. Bredesen,137 held that Jo-
hanns created the establishment and control test for determining govern-
ment speech, so that the government speech doctrine applies “when the 
government determines an overarching message and retains power to ap-
                                                          
 132.  Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 555–56 (2005). 
 133.  Id. at 560–62. 
 134.  Id. at 560–61. 
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Id. at 562.  The Johanns Court declined to address the beef producers’ argument that the 
beef ads could not be government speech because they are attributed to someone other than the 
government.  Id. at 564.  Many of the ads bore the attribution, “Funded by America’s Beef Pro-
ducers.”  Id. at 555.  However, the Court found that this argument “relate[d] to compelled speech 
rather than compelled subsidy, and therefore was inapplicable to this compelled subsidy case.  Id. 
at 564–65.  Compelled subsidy refers to when a private party is required by the government to 
fund someone else’s message; compelled speech refers to when a private party “is obliged person-
ally to express a message he disagrees with, imposed by the government.”  Id. at 557.  The Court 
found that the attribution argument might present a valid objection only if “‘those singled out to 
pay the tax are closely linked with the expression’ in a way that makes them appear to endorse the 
government message,” which it did not find to be the case here.  Id. at 565 n.8 (quoting id. at 575–
76 (Souter, J., dissenting)). 
 137.  441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006). 
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prove every word disseminated at its behest.”138  In Bredesen, the ACLU of 
Tennessee challenged the constitutionality of a Tennessee statute authoriz-
ing the issuance of a Choose Life plate without a corresponding pro-choice 
plate.139  Applying Johanns’s establishment and control test, the Sixth Cir-
cuit, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Fourth Circuit in Rose,140 
found that the Choose Life plate constituted government speech.141 
The Sixth Circuit found that Tennessee established the message on the 
Choose Life plate by specifying in the authorizing statute that the plates 
would display the words “Choose Life.”142  Furthermore, the court found 
that Tennessee exercised “final approval authority” over the Choose Life 
plate by retaining a veto over its design and through its power to withdraw 
the authorization.143  Therefore, the court concluded that, just like the feder-
al government in Johanns, “[t]he Tennessee legislature chose the ‘Choose 
Life’ plate’s overarching message and approved every word to be dissemi-
nated.”144  Thus, Tennessee did not violate the First Amendment by author-
izing the Choose Life plate without a corresponding pro-choice plate.145 
Judge Martin dissented in Bredesen, concluding that the majority erred 
by applying a compelled subsidy analysis “to a case where . . . nothing is 
compelled.”146  He explained that Johanns involved compelled subsidies to 
support the government’s message, which is immune from First Amend-
ment challenges, as opposed to compelled subsidies to support a private en-
tity’s message, which is unconstitutional.147  He noted that the potential 
harm in a compelled subsidy challenge “is being forced to give the govern-
ment money to pay for someone else’s message.”148  However, this harm is 
alleviated when the message is that of the government because “the gov-
ernment must be able to tax and spend in order to function.”149  Therefore, 
courts must determine whether the contested speech in compelled subsidy 
cases is that of the government or a private party in order to decide whether 
the compulsion is constitutional.150 
Judge Martin found that “[t]he First Amendment harm in this case . . . 
has nothing to do with being forced to speak or to subsidize a message.  Ra-
                                                          
 138.  Id. at 375. 
 139.  Id. at 371–72. 
 140.  See supra Part II.B.4. 
 141.  Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 376. 
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ther, the harm is being denied the opportunity to speak on the same terms as 
other private citizens within a government sponsored forum.”151  Therefore, 
he concluded that the Tennessee statute authorizing the Choose Life plate 
without a corresponding pro-choice plate constituted impermissible view-
point discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.152 
3.  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits Distinguished Johanns from the 
Specialty License Plate Analysis 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, in two cases challenging the constitu-
tionality of the respective state legislatures’ refusal to issue a Choose Life 
plate, both distinguished Johanns and limited the establishment and control 
test to compelled subsidy cases.  In Stanton, the Ninth Circuit applied the 
SCV four-factor test153 and held that the Choose Life plates constituted pri-
vate speech.154  Thus, the Arizona License Plate Commission, by denying 
the Arizona Life Coalition’s application for a specialty license plate, had 
engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First 
Amendment.155 
The Seventh Circuit, facing very similar facts in Choose Life Illinois, 
Inc. v. White,156 distilled the SCV four-factor test into a single inquiry: “Un-
der all the circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the speaker to 
be the government or a private party?”157  The court noted that “the degree 
to which the message originates with the government, the degree to which 
the government exercises editorial control over the message, and whether 
the government or a private party communicates the message” were among 
the factors to be considered in its analysis.158  Applying this simplified ver-
sion of the SCV test, the court found that the vehicle owners who display 
the specialty plates and the organizations whose logos or messages are de-
picted on them are the “most obvious speakers in the specialty-plate con-
text” and that “the driver is the ultimate communicator of the message.”159  
Therefore, the court concluded that the messages displayed on specialty li-
cense plates are not government speech.160  However, unlike the Ninth Cir-
                                                          
 151.  Id. at 386. 
 152.  Id. at 390.  Judge Martin further distinguished Johanns from “true compelled speech cas-
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cuit in Stanton, the court found that the Illinois General Assembly’s rejec-
tion of a Choose Life plate was viewpoint neutral and thus permissible be-
cause the state had excluded the subject of abortion from the specialty li-
cense plate forum altogether.161 
4.  The Fourth Circuit Inconsistently Applied both Johanns and the 
SCV Four-Factor Test in Government Speech Cases Outside of 
the Specialty License Plate Context 
After Johanns, the Fourth Circuit, in a number of government speech 
cases outside of the specialty-license-plate context, vacillated between ap-
plication of Johanns’s establishment and control test and the SCV four-
factor test.  For example, in Page, a county resident brought a Section 1983 
First Amendment action against a school district after being denied access 
to the school district’s website and other communication channels (such as 
letters distributed to students and e-mails sent to school district employees) 
to express his support for pending state legislation, which the school district 
opposed.162 
In determining whether the school district’s opposition to the bill con-
stituted government speech, the Fourth Circuit noted that Johanns distilled 
the SCV factors, “particularly in cases involving the government’s use of 
third-party messages, [into] (1) the government’s establishment of the mes-
sage, and (2) its effective control over the content and dissemination of the 
message.”163  Applying these factors to the school district’s opposition to 
the pending state legislation, the court found that the school district “estab-
lished its message to oppose” the bill.164  Furthermore, the school district 
“adopted and approved all speech, even that of third parties, as representa-
tive of its own position” and thus controlled the content of the message.165  
The school district also “controlled [the message’s] dissemination to the 
public” by distributing it through its own website, e-mails sent to employ-
ees, and letters sent home to students.166  Therefore, the court concluded 
that the school district’s opposition to the bill constituted government 
speech, and thus the school district “did not create a limited public forum to 
which [the county resident] was entitled access.”167  As such, the school 
district did not violate the First Amendment by denying him access to its 
communication channels.168 
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Just one month after its decision in Page, the Fourth Circuit addressed 
the government speech doctrine again in Turner, where the court returned to 
its application of the SCV four-factor test to determine that legislative pray-
ers at a city council meeting constitute government speech.169  Apparently 
contradicting the Page court’s “distillation” of the SCV factors into the Jo-
hanns establishment and control factors, the court in Turner affirmatively 
stated, “The Fourth Circuit has adopted a four-factor test for determining 
when speech can be attributed to the government.”170  The court did not 
mention, much less attempt to distinguish, either Johanns or Page. 
The Fourth Circuit continued its inconsistent treatment of the govern-
ment speech doctrine in Musgrave, where the court found that retailers’ ad-
vertisements for their video lottery machines constituted hybrid speech.171  
The court in Musgrave found that “the state [was] conveying a message for 
which it is politically accountable,” and that these two factors (a govern-
ment-conveyed message and political accountability) weighed in favor of 
government speech.172  The court cited Johanns in finding that the message 
conveyed by the government was one of moderation, but did not mention 
either the establishment or control factors.173  However, the court also noted 
that the speech was privately funded and that the retailers were the literal 
speakers of the advertisements.174  Citing SCV, the court found that these 
two factors weighed in favor of private speech.175  Thus, the court in Mus-
grave cited to both Johanns and SCV, but did not explicitly rely on either 
test in reaching its ultimate conclusion.  Instead, the court apparently exam-
ined the factors it found most relevant to the specific facts of this case, 
without employing any particular test for determining government speech.  
Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s varying analyses in Page, Turner, and Musgrave 
demonstrate its unprincipled approach to the government speech doctrine 
following Johanns. 
D.  The Supreme Court Employed a Literal Speaker Analysis in 
Summum, but Failed to Guide Lower Courts on the Proper Test for 
Distinguishing Government Speech 
With the circuits in disagreement about the proper test for determining 
government speech and the applicability of Johanns outside of the com-
pelled subsidy context, the Supreme Court addressed the government 
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speech doctrine again in Summum.176  After Summum, lower courts once 
again were left to decipher the relevant factors for determining government 
speech, the respective weight of each of those factors, and their applicabil-
ity to various factual circumstances.177 
1.  The Supreme Court Revived the Literal Speaker Factor for 
Government Speech Analysis in Summum 
Summum concerned a city-owned park in Pleasant Grove City, Utah 
(“City”), that displayed fifteen permanent monuments, eleven of which 
were donated by private parties.178  One of the donated monuments dis-
played the Ten Commandments.179  Summum, a religious organization, 
wished to donate a monument to the park that would display the Seven 
Aphorisms of Summum, but the City denied the organization’s requests.180  
Summum sued the City, seeking an injunction directing the City to erect its 
monument in the park.181  Summum contended that the City violated the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by accepting the Ten Com-
mandments monument but refusing the Summum monument.182 
The Court unanimously agreed that the monuments in the park, includ-
ing those that were privately donated, were government speech and thus not 
subject to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.183  However, the 
Court declined the opportunity to resolve the confusion over the proper test 
for determining when the government speaks on its own behalf.  While the 
Court did rely on Johanns in finding that “the City [had] ‘effectively con-
trolled’ the messages sent by the monuments in the Park by exercising ‘fi-
nal approval authority’ over their selection,”184 the Court did not state that 
establishment and control were the dispositive factors in determining gov-
ernment speech.  In fact, the Court deemphasized the importance of the 
government’s establishment of the message, a crucial factor in Johanns, by 
acknowledging that “many of the monuments were not designed or built by 
the City and were donated in completed form by private entities.”185 
The Court also implicitly appealed to the literal speaker factor of the 
SCV test, without citing any cases that had previously analyzed this factor 
and without explicitly stating that this factor weighs into the government 
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speech analysis.  The Court noted that property owners do not typically al-
low “the installation of permanent monuments [on their land] that convey a 
message with which they do not wish to be associated.”186  Thus, the Court 
found that “persons who observe donated monuments routinely—and rea-
sonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the property own-
er’s behalf.”187  Therefore, the Court concluded that in the case of the do-
nated monuments in the city-owned park, “there is little chance that 
observers will fail to appreciate the identity of the speaker.”188 
2.  The Eighth Circuit Also Employed a Literal Speaker Analysis, 
but Distinguished Summum 
Before Tata, only one circuit court had addressed government speech 
in the context of specialty license plates since the Summum decision. In 
Roach v. Stouffer,189 a pro-life organization challenged Missouri’s denial of 
its application for a specialty license plate.190  The Eighth Circuit, in a case 
of first impression in the circuit,191 discussed the approaches of its sister 
circuits when addressing specialty license plates,192 and ultimately adopted 
the simplified literal speaker test announced by the Seventh Circuit in 
White: “Our analysis boils down to one key question: whether, under all the 
circumstances, a reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the 
speaker to be the government or a private party.”193  Employing this analy-
sis, the court concluded “that a reasonable and fully informed observer 
would consider the speaker to be the organization that sponsors and the ve-
hicle owner who displays the specialty license plate.”194  Therefore, special-
ty license plates constitute private speech, and the state’s denial of the 
Choose Life plate constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination.195 
The Roach decision, issued just one month after Summum, distin-
guished that case in a footnote, stating that Summum did not require a find-
ing of government speech in the present case.196  The court noted that Sum-
mum dealt with privately donated monuments in a city-owned park, 
whereas specialty license plates are displayed on privately owned vehicles 
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and “facilitate expressive conduct on the part of the organization and its 
supporters, not the government.”197 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
On February 11, 2014, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision in Conti II198 and explicitly agreed with its conclusion that the 
Choose Life plate implicated private speech interests sufficient “to preclude 
a finding of purely government speech.”199  On appeal, North Carolina did 
not deny the Plaintiffs’ contention that its approval of the Choose Life plate 
and concurrent rejection of a pro-choice plate constituted viewpoint dis-
crimination.200  Instead, the State argued “that it was free to discriminate 
based on viewpoint because the license plate speech at issue was solely its 
own”—in other words, because the specialty plate constituted pure gov-
ernment speech to which First Amendment restrictions do not apply.201  The 
Fourth Circuit disagreed however, and concluded without hesitation that the 
Choose Life plate contained elements of private speech and therefore did 
not qualify as government speech.202 
North Carolina argued, as it had below, that the Fourth Circuit had 
“abandoned the SCV factors” for identifying government speech with its 
decision in Page.203  The court rejected this argument for three reasons: 1) 
because Page is not a Supreme Court or en banc decision, it could not over-
rule prior Fourth Circuit precedent;204 2) “Page does not suggest any at-
tempt to overthrow the SCV factors in favor of a single-factor control 
test”;205 and 3) Fourth Circuit decisions after Page explicitly analyzed the 
SCV factors in determining government speech.206  North Carolina also reit-
erated its argument that Johanns and Summum “implicitly overruled” the 
SCV test and asserted that those cases confirm the government’s control 
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over the speech as the dispositive factor and eliminate any reliance on the 
literal speaker factor.207  The Fourth Circuit disagreed and stated, “We can-
not square the Supreme Court’s multi-faceted, context-specific reasoning in 
Summum with North Carolina’s blanket contention that all that matters is 
who controls the message.”208 
After concluding that the SCV factors “remain appropriate tools for 
evaluating whether speech is government, private, or both,” the Fourth Cir-
cuit applied those factors to the Choose Life plate.209  The court found that 
three factors—the central purpose of the program in which the speech in 
question occurs, the identity of the literal speaker, and which party bears the 
ultimate responsibility for the speech—weighed in favor of private 
speech.210  The remaining factor—the degree of editorial control exercised 
by the government over the content—weighed in favor of government 
speech.211 
First, the court determined “that the purpose of the specialty license 
plate program, including the ‘Choose Life’ plate, is to allow North Carolina 
drivers to express their affinity for various special interests, as well as to 
raise revenue for the state.”212  Furthermore, the court concluded that, with 
over 200 specialty plates to choose from covering a range of interests, “[i]t 
defies logic, and may in fact create other problems (such as Establishment 
Clause issues in the case of the Knights of Columbus [specialty plate of-
fered by the State]) to suggest that all of these plates constitute North Caro-
lina’s—and only North Carolina’s—message.”213 
Second, the court found, as both parties had agreed, that North Caroli-
na exercised complete editorial control over the content of the message.214  
Third, the Fourth Circuit noted that “the Supreme Court [in Wooley] 
deemed license plates a sphere of private ‘intellect and spirit’ that ‘im-
plicat[es] First Amendment protections’ from government control”215 and 
concluded that the literal speaker of a message on a specialty license plate 
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that the vehicle owner selected must be the vehicle owner.216  Fourth and 
finally, the Fourth Circuit held that the private party bears the ultimate re-
sponsibility for the speech’s content because “‘[w]hen a special license 
plate is purchased, it is really the private citizen who engages the govern-
ment to publish his message,’ not the other way around.”217  The specialty 
plate would not exist but for the private party establishing, applying for, and 
paying for it, while the government’s role is limited to that of publisher of 
the private message.218 
Because North Carolina did not challenge the district court’s conclu-
sion that, upon finding that the specialty license plates implicate private 
speech rights, offering a Choose Life plate while refusing to authorize a 
pro-choice plate constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination in vio-
lation of the First Amendment,219 and because that conclusion was support-
ed by Rose, the Fourth Circuit did not disturb that finding.220  The State did 
contend, however, that its inability to filter out certain specialty plates 
would “force it to end its specialty plate program.”221  The court responded 
that its ruling “does not render [North] Carolina powerless to regulate its 
specialty license plate forum,”222 as long as it does so “in a viewpoint-
neutral fashion.”223  The court suggested as an alternative that North Caro-
lina could “choose to avoid the reproductive choice debate altogether,” and 
noted that the Seventh Circuit had upheld such a restriction as being view-
point neutral and thus permissible.224 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Although the Fourth Circuit in Tata correctly concluded that the 
Choose Life plate constituted private, not government, speech, it incorrectly 
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interpreted the Supreme Court case law on the government speech doctrine, 
which resulted in it employing an improper analysis to reach this conclu-
sion.  The Fourth Circuit should have distinguished Johanns and limited its 
application to compelled subsidy cases.225  Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit 
should have interpreted Summum as analyzing the two dispositive factors in 
government speech cases that do not involve compulsion.226 
The Fourth Circuit should have simplified and reduced its four-factor 
balancing test into a dispositive two-element test: the actual and apparent 
accountability test.  Under this test, the contested speech is that of the gov-
ernment if (1) the government controls the content and dissemination of the 
message, and (2) the government appears, to a reasonable and fully in-
formed observer, to be the literal speaker of the message.  The existence of 
these two elements ensures that the government can be held accountable for 
its speech through the political process and thus the contested speech can 
properly be characterized as government speech.227  If either or both of 
these elements are lacking, then the contested speech is private speech and 
traditional First Amendment protections apply. 
A.  The Rationale Underlying the Government Speech Doctrine 
Supports the Actual and Apparent Accountability Test 
The actual and apparent accountability test promotes the underlying ra-
tionale behind the government speech doctrine: political accountability.  
The Supreme Court explained in Southworth that government speech is ex-
empt from traditional First Amendment protections because the government 
can be held accountable to the public through the political process: “If the 
citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different 
or contrary position.”228  The Fourth Circuit elaborated on this position by 
stating that “where the government itself is responsible, and therefore ac-
countable, for the message that its speech sends, the danger ordinarily in-
volved in governmental viewpoint-based choices is not present.”229  This 
accountability also explains why, when the government speaks for itself, it 
can restrict speech on the basis of viewpoint “to ensure that its message is 
neither garbled nor distorted”230—because if the government is to be held 
accountable for its speech, it is imperative that the public is able to delineate 
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its message from that of other speakers.  Thus, the linchpin of the govern-
ment speech doctrine is governmental accountability.231 
The government’s actual ability to control the content and dissemina-
tion of its message, and its appearance to the public as the literal speaker, 
are both necessary to hold the government accountable for its speech 
through the political process.  The first element establishes the govern-
ment’s actual accountability for its speech, while the second element estab-
lishes the government’s apparent accountability to the public for its speech.  
As the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have observed in their 
government speech cases, speech cannot be attributed to the government 
unless a reasonable observer would understand that it is the government that 
is speaking.232  This is because the government cannot be held accountable 
for its speech through the political process if the citizenry does not recog-
nize that it is the government doing the speaking.233  Without such recogni-
tion, the public would not see the need to elect new officials who “espouse 
some different or contrary position” to the one with which they disagree.234 
Just as important to the goal of government accountability is the gov-
ernment’s ability to control the content and dissemination of its message.  
The importance of this element is made clear in the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in Johanns and Summum, and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bredes-
en, all of which heavily relied on the government’s effective control over 
the message in finding that the contested speech in each case was that of the 
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government.235  Just as the government cannot be held accountable for 
speech if the public does not know that the government is speaking, the 
government also cannot be held accountable for speech when it has no abil-
ity to control the content and dissemination of the message that is ultimately 
expressed to the public.236  If such were the case, the newly elected offi-
cials, even if they espouse a different viewpoint from their predecessors, 
would be unable to alter the government’s message in response to public 
concern.  Therefore, the government must have the ability to control the 
content and dissemination of its message, and thus the ability to respond to 
the political process, in order to be held accountable for its speech. 
B.  Summum Employed an Actual and Apparent Accountability 
Analysis to Distinguish Government Speech, Without Making the 
Test Explicit 
As the most recent Supreme Court decision to address government 
speech and the more factually similar case, the Fourth Circuit should have 
found the analysis in Summum to be controlling in Tata, and should have 
limited the analysis of Johanns to the compelled subsidy context.  In Sum-
mum, the Court did not state any particular test or required factors for de-
termining what constitutes government speech.  However, the Court explic-
itly relied on the government’s ability to control the content and 
dissemination of its message,237 and referenced the government’s appear-
ance as the literal speaker,238 in finding that the privately donated monu-
ments on government-owned property constitute government speech.239  
The Court cited Johanns in finding that the City “effectively controlled” the 
message expressed through the monuments in that it exercised “final ap-
proval authority” over which monuments were selected.240 
Interestingly, the Court in Summum did not mention the other element 
that was critical in Johanns—the government’s establishment of the mes-
sage.  Indeed, this element weighed against a finding of government speech 
in Summum because the messages of the monuments were established by 
the private individuals and organizations who created and donated them, not 
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by the government.241  The Court’s inattention to this element in Summum 
suggests its inapplicability to the government speech determination outside 
of the compelled subsidy context. 
However, the Court did allude to the government’s appearance to the 
public as the literal speaker of the messages displayed on the monuments.242  
Although the Court did not cite any of the circuit court decisions that had 
explicitly used this factor in the government speech analysis, nor did the 
Court state that this factor was necessary or even relevant to its determina-
tion, it apparently discussed the literal speaker factor to support its conclu-
sion that privately donated monuments on government-owned property 
constitute government speech.243  Specifically, the Court stated that a rea-
sonable observer would ordinarily expect that a permanent monument on 
one’s property reflects the property owner’s viewpoint.244  Therefore, the 
public is aware that it is the government, rather than the private donors, who 
is speaking through the monuments in the city park. 
Thus, in Tata, the Fourth Circuit should have interpreted Summum as 
finding the government’s control over the message and its appearance as the 
literal speaker to be the two critical factors in distinguishing government 
speech.  The importance of the control factor is made clear in the Summum 
opinion in that it is the Court’s primary focus in finding in favor of gov-
ernment speech.245  However, it is doubtful that the Court would have 
reached the same conclusion if that finding was not also supported by the 
literal speaker factor.  Furthermore, the Court’s virtual silence on the estab-
lishment factor, and its acknowledgement that this factor actually weighed 
against a finding of government speech in that case, should have been inter-
preted by the Fourth Circuit as dispensing with this element in the govern-
ment speech analysis, at least in cases not concerning compelled subsidies. 
C.  The Fourth Circuit Already Emphasizes the Government’s Control 
and the Literal Speaker Factors in the SCV Four-Factor Test 
When employing the SCV four-factor test to distinguish government 
speech, the Fourth Circuit already emphasizes the degree of governmental 
control and literal speaker factors more so than it does the other two factors.  
Although the court describes the four factors as “instructive” and notes that 
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no particular factor is dispositive,246 the Seventh and Eighth Circuits both 
found that the SCV test could be simplified into a single factor—that of the 
literal speaker.247  The Fourth Circuit itself consistently analyzes the literal 
speaker factor and the ultimate responsibility factor as if they are equiva-
lent, rather than two separate factors.248  Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit 
has consistently refused to attribute speech to the government when the lit-
eral speaker/ultimate responsibility factor weighs against it—even if both of 
the other factors weigh in its favor.249  Therefore, the Fourth Circuit appears 
to place greater weight on the literal speaker/ultimate responsibility factor 
than on the other two factors combined. 
However, the Fourth Circuit has not gone as far as the Seventh and 
Eighth Circuits in holding that the literal speaker factor is the sole, determi-
native factor.250  By retaining its other factors—the purpose of the program 
in which the speech occurs and the government’s degree of control over the 
speech—the Fourth Circuit has recognized the importance of actual gov-
ernment accountability to a finding of government speech.  But these two 
factors also can be reduced to a single factor—the government’s ability to 
control the content and dissemination of its message.  The other SCV fac-
tor—the purpose of the program in which the speech occurs—does not add 
value to the analysis because it merely informs the other factors in a conclu-
sory manner.  For example, when the court finds that the purpose of the 
program is to promote individual expression, this necessarily implies that 
the literal speaker is the private party.251  In contrast, when the court finds 
that the purpose of the program is to promulgate the state’s message on a 
particular subject, this generally supports a finding that the government 
controls the content and dissemination of that message.252  Thus, the pur-
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pose factor is merely an approximation for the control and literal speaker 
factors, and does not need to be analyzed separately. 
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in government speech cases is 
generally consistent with the actual and apparent accountability test in that 
it emphasizes the importance of the government’s ability to control the 
speech as well as the public’s recognition of the government as speaker.  
However, the Fourth Circuit could have made its analysis in Tata more 
clear and concise by consolidating the literal speaker and ultimate responsi-
bility factors into a single factor—apparent accountability—and eliminating 
the conclusory purpose of the program factor. 
D.  Johanns’s Establishment and Control Test Is Limited to Compelled 
Subsidy Cases 
The Fourth Circuit should have limited the establishment and control 
test utilized by the Supreme Court in Johanns to compelled subsidy cases, 
and thus should not have applied it to the specialty license plate context 
where neither speech nor financial support is compelled.  Different interests 
are at stake when a private party is compelled by the government to either 
fund or personally endorse someone else’s message, as opposed to when the 
government restricts a private party’s ability to speak in a government-
sponsored forum.253  Therefore, it is inappropriate for courts to apply the 
same analysis to compelled subsidy cases as they do to government speech 
cases that do not involve compulsion.254  As such, the Fourth Circuit in Tata 
should have limited the establishment and control test of Johanns to cases 
involving compulsion, and utilized the actual and apparent accountability 
test instead. 
The potential harm in a compelled subsidy case is a private party being 
forced by the government to fund the expression of someone else’s message 
with which the private party does not agree.255  This is permissible when the 
message is that of the government because it must be able to tax and spend 
in order to function.256  However, the government violates the First 
Amendment when it forces a private party to fund another private party’s 
expression.257  Therefore, the government’s establishment of an overarching 
message, as was found in Johanns, is particularly important to the determi-
nation of constitutionality in compelled subsidy cases. 
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The same concern is not present, however, in cases where a private 
party is denied access to speak in a government-sponsored forum.  In these 
cases, the potential “harm is being denied the opportunity to speak on the 
same terms as other private citizens within” the forum.258  Therefore, the 
determination of which entity (public or private) established the message is 
less important than the determination of which entity is actually communi-
cating the message.  If private parties are speaking in a government-
sponsored forum, then the government cannot restrict access to that forum 
based on viewpoint; if the government is merely using its own communica-
tion channels to express its own view, then it may restrict the expression of 
opposing viewpoints through those channels “to ensure that its message is 
neither garbled nor distorted.”259  The actual and apparent accountability 
test determines which entity is actually communicating the contested mes-
sage by examining who has control over its content and dissemination and 
who appears to be the literal speaker.260 
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit should have interpreted the Johanns es-
tablishment and control test as limited to compelled subsidies cases.  Tata 
did not involve a compelled subsidy because the North Carolina vehicle 
owners were not being forced to pay for the Choose Life plate; rather, they 
were petitioning the government for the opportunity to pay for their own 
pro-choice plates.261  Thus, the Johanns establishment and control test does 
not apply to Tata, or to specialty license plate cases in general.  The Sev-
enth and Ninth Circuits correctly interpreted Johanns as being limited to 
compelled subsidy (and possibly compelled speech) cases, and therefore 
distinguished it from specialty license plate cases.262  The Fourth Circuit in 
Tata also correctly noted that Johanns and Summum taken together demon-
strate that different factors are relevant in different circumstances when dis-
tinguishing government from private speech.263  However, the court did not 
go far enough in differentiating the applicability of each of these two cases.  
Instead, the court continued to rely on Johanns to support its conclusion 
that specialty license plates constitute mixed speech.264  It was an error for 
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Johanns to influence the court’s decision in Tata because it is wholly inap-
plicable to the specialty license plate context.265 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Tata, the Fourth Circuit determined that the Choose Life plate con-
stituted private speech.266  Therefore, North Carolina engaged in impermis-
sible viewpoint discrimination by authorizing the issuance of the Choose 
Life plate while refusing to issue a pro-choice specialty license plate.267  
Although the court arrived at the correct conclusion in Tata, it did so by 
employing the inadequate SCV four-factor test for determining what consti-
tutes government speech.268  Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit incorrectly in-
terpreted Johanns as being relevant outside of the compelled subsidy con-
text,269 and failed to recognize that Summum makes clear that the two most 
important factors in the government speech analysis are the government’s 
control over the content and dissemination of the message and the govern-
ment’s appearance to a reasonable observer as the literal speaker.270  There-
fore, the Fourth Circuit should have taken the opportunity in Tata to remedy 
its inconsistent treatment of the government speech doctrine by employing 
the actual and apparent accountability test, which utilizes these two factors, 
to determine whether the Choose Life plate constituted government 
speech.271  The existence of a simplified and clarified analysis governing 
the government speech doctrine would both ensure that the government can 
be held accountable for its speech through the political process, and prevent 
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the government from improperly relying on the doctrine to suppress disfa-
vored viewpoints in a speech forum.272 
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